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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF MARSHALL
No. 85-211
DAVID GORDON,
Petitioner
vs.

) On appeal from the Appellate Court
) of the State of Marshall, there
) heard on appeal from the Circuit
) Court of Plymouth County, State
) of Marshall.

RICHARD DOUGLAS, dfb/a
EZ CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
Respondent.
BENCH MEMORANDUM
GEORGE B. TRUBOW*
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case comes before the Supreme Court of the State of Marshall on its order granting Petitioner, David Gordon, leave to appeal
the decision of the Appellate Court of the State of Marshall. The
parties are instructed to address all issues raised in the Appellate
Court opinion.
The case came before the Appellate Court on an appeal from an
order of the Circuit Court of Plymouth County, granting the defendant-appellee's motion for summary judgment. The facts are not disputed. The Petitioner, David Gordon ("Gordon"), owns and operates a personal home computer and has programmed it to serve as
the host for an electronic bulletin board.
Gordon advertises his bulletin board, which he calls
"Gordotalk," in various trade magazines. Those who are interested
in home repairs and do-it-yourself carpentry work are invited to use
the bulletin board to communicate with others having similar interests. Anyone who has a computer equipped with a "modem"-a device that allows a computer to be connected with standard telephone
lines-can gain access to Gordon's computer by telephone.
Once connected with the computer bulletin board, the caller can
read messages that have been posted on the system. In order to post
messages, however, one must obtain a unique password from Gordon
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Information Technology and Privacy Law, The John Marshall Law School. The author thanks Michael Booden (J.D.
1985) and Bradley Foreman J.D. (1984), student research assistants from the Privacy
Center, for their excellent assistance in preparing the bench memorandum.
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by paying him an annual $20 registration fee which covers the costs
of operating the system but provides no profits. Gordon generally
does not know a user's identity. A user will typically send a money
order to cover annual dues, using only a "moniker" or nickname to
identify himself. The user will either enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope or call Gordon personally to obtain his password.
It is not practical for Gordon to keep records of the users' addresses
because they often use blind box numbers. Gordon registers only
200 passwords and, if the annual fee is not paid, he will cancel the
password when the one-year term expires.
Gordon operates the bulletin board as a hobby. Although
"Gordotalk" could be programmed to hold messages before they are
posted, there is too much traffic for Gordon to personally screen
messages and operate the system merely as a hobby. Unless a user
posts an identifier, messages will be anonymous because the system
does not keep track of what password is used to post a message.
Messages left on the bulletin board are stored in the computer's
memory; the oldest messages are automatically deleted to make
room for new ones when the memory becomes full. Gordon, as the
system operator, is the only one who can remove messages from the
bulletin board unless the computer's program automatically deletes
messages.
On Saturday, March 17, 1984, Gordon and his family left town
on vacation early in the morning. The bulletin board was left operating during Gordon's absence. Sometime during that morning, the
following message appeared on the bulletin board:
"Attention readers: Avoid doing any business with EZ Construction
Co. of Plymouth City. The owner is not a licensed contractor and his
work frequently does not meet building code requirements."
This message was brought to the attention of the plaintiff,
Richard Douglas ("Douglas"), who is the owner of EZ Construction
Company, at about noon on March 17. Douglas immediately tried to
contact Gordon, but was unable to do so until Monday, March 26,
by which time the message had disappeared from the bulletin board.
Gordon did not see the message on the board before he left on vacation. He returned from vacation on Sunday, March 25, 1984, late in
the evening. Douglas is a properly licensed contractor and the accusation that he does not comply with the building codes is false.
Douglas filed an action for defamation in the Circuit Court of
Plymouth County seeking presumed damages of $400,000. Gordon
subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings arguing
(1) that Gordon was not the publisher of the defamatory statement,
and (2) that even if Gordon were the publisher, presumed damages
are not recoverable because Douglas failed to allege that Gordon
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knew that the defamatory statement was false or that he exhibited
reckless disregard as to its falsity. The trial court granted the
motion.
On appeal to the Appellate Court of the State of Marshall, the
order of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded. The
appellate court found that Gordon was a publisher of the defamatory material that appeared on his bulletin board. Gordon authorized users to post messages and he had the power to remove
messages. His control of the bulletin board, the court held, rendered
him a publisher of any material that was posted on it.
The appellate court also found that Douglas is not required to
prove the strict "actual malice" standard enunciated in New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964), and its progeny. The appellate court found that Douglas is not a public official
or a public figure and the subject matter of the defamatory statement is not a matter of public concern. Accordingly, the court held
that the constitutional requirements in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974), are inapplicable to the instant
case, and the common law of the State of Marshall applies.
Gordon filed his petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court of Marshall. The court granted the petition and directed the
parties to address all the issues raised in the appellate court.
ANALYSIS
I. IS GORDON A PUBLISHER OF DEFAMATORY
MATERIAL?
To state a cause of action for defamation it is "necessary for the
plaintiff to prove as part of his prima facie case that the defendant
(1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and concerning the plaintiff." Prosser and Keaton, The Law of Torts, p. 802
(5th ed. 1984). An essential element to tort liability, therefore, is
that the defendant communicated or "published" the defamatory
material to someone other than the person defamed. Id. at 797.
In this instance, the petitioner operates a computer bulletin
board available for others to post messages. There are no cases dealing with publication on a computer bulletin board, though for other
media, the courts have said that liability depends upon an affirmative duty to remove or prevent a publication by another, or upon the
extent of the defendant's participation in publishing the defamatory
statement. In the following cases the defendant's duty, or his participation, was sufficient to incur liability.
In Fogg v. Boston & L.R. Co., 148 Mass. 513, 20 N.E. 109 (1889),
the defendant railroad was held liable when its employee posted a
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defamatory message on the train station's bulletin board. The court
held that the employee's physical posting of the notice and failure to
remove it after being informed of its defamatory nature was sufficient to constitute participation in the publication of the information. Id.
In Heller v. Bianco, 11 Cal. App.2d 424, 244 P.2d 757 (1952),
the defendant tavern owner was held liable when his employee, having been notified by plaintiff's husband, allowed a defamatory message to remain on the walls of the tavern's toilet. Heller is in accord
with the Restatement of Torts 2d 577(2) (1977), "One who intentionally and unreasonably fails to remove defamatory matter that he
knows to be exhibited on land or chattels in his possession or under
his control is subject to liability for its continued publication." The
court stated that "persons who invite the public to their premises
owe a duty to other not to knowingly permit their walls to be occupied with defamatory matter." Heller v. Bianco, supra at 759.
In World Publishing Co. v. Minahan,173 P. 815 (Sup. Ct. Okla.
1918), the court found the editor of a newspaper liable for the publication of a defamatory article which was published while he was
away on vacation. The court said, "The managing editor of a newspaper is equally liable with the proprietor for the publication or not,
as it is his duty to know the contents of all articles published." Id.
The court in Sorensen v. Wood, 243 N.W. 82 (Sup. Ct. Neb.
1932), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 599, 54 S.Ct. 209 (1933), held that a
radio station has a duty to prevent defamatory words from being
spoken by third parties and transmitted to the radio public through
its facilities. The court found that the radio station was liable when
it failed to censor a prepared script made available prior to the
broadcast. Id.
In Paton v. Great Northwestern Telegraph Co., 170 N.W. 511
(Sup. Ct. Minn. 1919), the court found the telegraph company liable
for the publication of patently defamatory matter that it received
and sent over its equipment without making any inquiry as to its
truth or falsity. The court said, "(a) telegraph company may be required to respond in damages for transmitting and delivering a message libelous on its face, unless the message be privileged or the
charge be justified." The court added that, a communication is
"privileged if the operator acted carefully and in good faith, but was
not privileged if he was negligent or wanting in good faith, in sending it." Id.
The following cases are instances where the courts have not
found the defendant's duty or participation to be sufficient to establish responsibility for the publication of defamatory matter.
In Scott v. Hull, 22 Ohio App.2d 141, 259 N.E.2d 160 (1970),
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the court held that the defendants were not liable for defamation
where an unknown person inscribed grafiti defaming the plaintiff on
the exterior wall of a building owned and maintained by the defendants. The court said that liability for defamation must be "predicated upon actual publication by the defendant or on the defendant's ratification of a publication by another." Id. at 161.
Publication involves "a positive act or something done by the person
sought to be charged, malfeasance in the case of an intentional defamatory publication and misfeasance in the case of a negligent defamatory publication. Nonfeasance, on the other hand, is not a predicate for liability." Id. at 162.
The court in Folwell v. Miller, 145 F. 495 (2d. Cir. 1906), held
that the president of a newspaper was not individually liable for a
libel published in his absence. The court said that "when it appears
affirmatively that defendant was not on duty during any part of the
time between the reception of the libelous matter by the newspaper
and the publication, and could not have had any actual part in composing or publishing, we think he cannot be held liable without disregarding the settled rule of law by which no man is bound for the
tortious act of another over whom he has not a master's power of
control." Id. at 497.
The court in Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co.,
336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939), did not find the defendant radio
station liable for an impromptu defamatory statement extemporaneously spoken by a person hired by a lessee and not in the employ of
the defendant. The court concluded that the broadcaster's liability
is extinguished through its exercise of due care in the selection of a
lessee and the inspection and editing of the script to be broadcast:
"A broadcasting company which leases its time and facilities to another, whose agents carry on the program, is not liable for an interjected defamatory remark where it appears that it exercised due
care in the selection of the lessee, and, having inspected and edited
the script, had no reason to believe an extemporaneous defamatory
remark would be made." Id.
In Anderson v. New York Telephone Co., 35 N.Y.2d 746, 361
N.Y.S. 2d 913 (1974), the Court of appeals of New York ruled that
the defendant telephone company was not a publisher of a defamatory message that was transmitted over the defendant's equipment.
The court held that there was no publication by the defendant because it did not directly participate in disseminating the defamatory
material. Id. at 752. Even if the defendant had been informed about
the nature of the message being communicated, the court held that
there is no publication because the defendant never "participated in
preparing the message, exercised any discretion or control over its
communication, or in any way assumed responsibility." Id.
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In Maynard v. Port Publications, Inc., 98 Wis. 2d 555, 297
N.E.2d 500 (1980), the defendant, a contract printer, was not held
liable for printing a newspaper containing a defamatory statement.
The court said, "that those who are held liable for defamation because of their role in the publication process must know or have reason to know of the existence of the libel." The court found that the
defendant, like other contract printers, provided "a quick and inexpensive printing service that by its low cost allows access to the
print media by groups that would otherwise not find such access."
The court concluded that placing liability on contract printers might
deter them from printing controversial material and have a deleterious effect on the free dissemination of information.
In the instant appeal, Douglas may contend that Gordon sufficiently participated in communicating the defamatory message to be
deemed a publisher, because he had complete control over the bulletin board, made it available specifically for the publication of
messages, invited the public to post and read messages on the system, and chose to ignore how the system was used.
Gordon may counter that he provides a free public service, has
no knowledge of message content, does not directly participate in
publishing messages, and has no duty to censor the speech of those
who use the system.
II.

IS THE DEFAMATORY MESSAGE A MATTER OF
PUBLIC CONCERN?

Prior to 1964, defamatory publications did not come within the
area of constitutionally protected speech because they were false
statements and the constitution was held to protect the truth, not
lies. The law of defamation was the sole province of state courts and
legislatures. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266, 72 S.Ct. 725,
735 (1952). In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283,
84 S.Ct. 710, 727 (1964), the United States Supreme Court held that
"the Constitution delineates a State's power to award damages for
libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct" (emphasis supplied). Subsequent to New York Times,
the court developed the scope of the constitutional limitations on
state defamation law in an attempt to reach an accommodation between the states' interests in compensating individuals for harm to
reputation and First Amendment concerns for free speech. Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-43, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3008 (1974).
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Development of the "Actual Malice" Standard.

The plaintiff in New York Times alleged that he had been libeled by statements made in an advertisement published in the defendant's newspaper. 376 U.S. at 256-57, 84 S.Ct. at 713. The advertisement concerned widespread, non-violent demonstrations staged
by "Southern Negro Students" in support of their rights guaranteed
by the Constitution. Id. The advertisement claimed that these students were being met by a wave of terror. Id. The plaintiff, who was
the commissioner of police when the incidents occurred, claimed
that the illustrations of the "wave of terror" reported in the advertisement referred to him because the conduct complained of was either carried out by the police or imputable to the police department
for which he was responsible. 376 U.S. at 258, 84 S.Ct. at 714. Some
of the statements in the advertisement were inaccurate descriptions
of the events that occurred. Id.
The court stated that the case must be considered in the context of "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 376
U.S. at 270, 84 S.Ct. at 721. The Court also noted that the advertisement concerned a "movement whose existence and objectives are
matters of the highest public interest and concern." 376 U.S. at 270,
84 S.Ct. at 721. In holding that the advertisement clearly qualified
for constitutional protection, the Court found that it was "an expression of grievance and protest on one of the major public issues
of our time." 376 U.S. at 266, 84 S.Ct. at 718. The only issue, according to the Court, is whether the advertisement loses its constitutional protection because some of its factual statements are false
and by its alleged defamation of the plaintiff. Id.
The New York Times Court ruled that "neither factual error
nor defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional shield
from criticism of official conduct." 376 U.S. at 273, 84 U.S. at 722.
The common law rule allowing only truth as a defense to libel actions was held inadequate to protect First Amendment rights. 376
U.S. at 278, 84 S.Ct. at 725. The Court found that by requiring the
critics of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all factual assertions, they "may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even
though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true,
because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the
expense of having to do so. * * * The rule thus dampens the vigor and

limits the variety of public debate." 376 U.S. at 279, 84 S.Ct. at 725.
Recognizing the threat of self-censorship, the Court ruled that the
constitutional guarantees require a rule
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"that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to this official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not."

376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726.
After examining the evidence, the New York Times Court held
that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate actual malice, and the judgment for the plaintiff was set aside. 376 U.S. at 285, 84 S.Ct. at 72829.
The New York Times "actual malice" standard was subsequently extended by the Supreme Court to cases in which the plaintiff is a "public figure." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
87 S.Ct. 1975 (1967). Butts was decided together with its companion
case Associated Press v. Walker. In Butts, an article published in
the defendant's magazine accused the plaintiff of conspiring to "fix"
a football game. 388 U.S. at 135-36, 87 S.Ct. at 1981. The plaintiff
was the athletic director of the University of Georgia and had previously served as head football coach. Id. He was a well-known and
respected figure in coaching ranks. Id. In Walker, the defendant released a news dispatch giving an account of a riot that erupted because of Federal efforts to enforce a court decree ordering the enrollment of a black man as a student in the University of Mississippi.
388 U.S. at 140, 87 S.Ct. at 1983-84. The dispatch stated that the
plaintiff led a violent crowd in a charge against federal Marshalls on
the campus. Id. He was also described as encouraging rioters to use
violence. Id. Although the plaintiff was a private citizen at the time
of the riot and publication, he was "acutely interested in the issue of
physical federal intervention, and had made a number of strong
statements against such action which had received wide publicity."
Id. The plaintiff had his own following, and he "could fairly be
deemed a man of some political prominence." Id.
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41 S.Ct. 1811
(1970), the defendant's radio station broadcast news reports concerning the plaintiff's arrest for possession of obscene literature. 403
U.S. at 34-35, 91 S.Ct. at 1815. Some of the reports, used the terms
"smut literature racket" and "girlie book peddlers." Id. The plaintiff
filed a libel action for damages after he was acquitted of criminal
obscenity charges upon a ruling that the magazines were not obscene. 405 U.S. at 36, 91 S.Ct. at 1816.
In affirming the Court of Appeals, which reversed an award of
damages for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court applied the New York
Times "actual malice" standard. The Court ruled that the standard
applies "to all discussion and communication involving matters of
public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons in-
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volved are famous or anonymous." 403 U.S. at 43-44, 91 S.Ct. at
1820. The Court did not define what "an issue of public or general
concern" means, but explained that "it was leaving the definition of
the reach of that term to future cases." 403 U.S. at 44-45, 91 S.Ct. at
1820.
Four years after it was decided, Rosenbloom was limited by the
Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346, 94
S.Ct. 2997, 3010 (1974). The Gertz court held that "the New York
Times rule states an accommodation between (the First Amendment) concern and the limited state interest present in the context
of libel actions brought by public persons." 418 U.S. at 343, 94 S.Ct.
at 3008. The Court said that
" ...the States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to
enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehoods injurious to the reputation of a private individual. The extension of the New York Times
test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a degree that we find unacceptable. And it
would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal
judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues
of 'general or public interest' and which do not-to determine, in the
words of Mr. Justice Marshall, 'what information is relevant to selfgovernment.'"
Accordingly, the result was that the New York Times "actual malice" standard was not required when the defamatory statement involved issues of general or public interest.
B. The New Standards Enunciated in Gertz.
In Gertz, the defendant published the American Opinion, a
monthly magazine expressing the views of the John Birch Society.
418 U.S. at 325-26, 94 S.Ct. at 3000. As part of a continuing effort to
warn the public of a nationwide Communist conspiracy to discredit
local police, an article appeared in the magazine in March 1969 entitled "FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio and The War On Police." Id.
Nuccio was a policeman who was tried for the murder of a youth
named Nelso. Id. The plaintiff, Elmer Gertz, was portrayed as the
architect of "frame-up" and the article made several false and inaccurate statements about him. Id.
The Court held that the plaintiff was neither a public official
nor a public figure, and that the New York Times standard does not
apply. 418 U.S. at 345-46, 94 S.Ct. at 3010. In defining the appropriate standard of liability, the Court held that the
"We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault,
the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious
to a private individual."
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Id. The court explained that this approach recognizes the strength
of the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals
for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for defamation." 418
U.S. at 348, 94 S.Ct. at 3011. Accordingly, subject to the Gertz case
a private plaintiff must establish at least negligence to recover in a
libel action.
Although the Court principally relied upon its recognition of the
"strong and legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals" as the basis of this new standard, it ruled that
"this countervailing state interest extends no further than compensation for actual injury ... (W)e hold that the States may not permit
recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is
not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
for the truth."
418 U.S. at 348-49, 94 S.Ct. at 3011. The Court reasoned that the
possibility of presumed and punitive damages "compounds the potential of any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit
the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms." 418 U.S. at
349-50, 94 S.Ct. at 3012. Consequently, under Gertz presumed and
punitive damages cannot be recovered by a private plaintiff absent a
showing of "actual malice," though actual damages can be recovered
for mere negligence alone.
There has been considerable speculation concerning whether
the requirements enunciated in Gertz are limited to defamation only
by media defendants. The Court's opinion is replete with references
to "newspapers," "broadcasters," "publishers, and the "media." In
the Court'a analysis of the accommodation which must be reached
among competing interests, for instance, it characterizes the balance
as one "between the needs of the press and the individual's claim to
compensation for wrongful injury." 418 U.S. at 343, 94 S.Ct. at 3009
(emphasis added). With respect to presumed and punitive damages,
the Court explained that they threaten "to inhibit the exercise of
First Amendment freedoms" and increase "the danger of media selfcensorship." 418 U.S. at 349-50, 94 S.Ct. at 3012 (emphasis added).
As a result, there is disagreement in the lower courts as to whether
Gertz applies only to media defendants. Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d
731 (D.C. Cir. 1975): Gertz is applicable to cases involving both media and non-media defendants. Rowe v. Metz, 195 Cal. 424, 579 P.2d
83 (1978): Gertz applies only to cases involving media defendants.
C. Application of Gertz: The Public Concern Test.
The Supreme Court recently tried to settle the confusion surrounding the application of Gertz in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
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U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 2939 (1985). In Green-

moss Builders, a contractor brought a defamation action against a
credit reporting agency. The defendant had erroneously reported
that the plaintiff had filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy, and
defendant grossly misrepresented the plaintiffs assets and liabilities. This report was sent to five of the defendant's subscribers pursuant to an agreement under which subscribers will not reveal the
information to others. 105 S.Ct. at 2941. The plaintiff brought an
action for defamation. 105 S.Ct. at 2941-42.
The Vermont Supreme Court held that "as a matter of federal
constitutional law, the media protections outlined in Gertz are inapplicable to non-media defamation actions." Greenmoss Builders,
Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 461 A.2d 414, 418 (1983).
As a result, Gertz was held inapplicable to the case, and since the
plaintiff was not a public official or public figure it was not required
to prove "actual malice" to recover punitive damages. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Vermont Supreme Court, but not based on the distinction between media and
non-media defendants. 105 S.Ct. at 2942. Instead, the Court held
that a distinction must be made between "matters of public concern" and "matters of purely private concern." 105 S.Ct. at 2945-46.
The Greenmoss Builders Court addressed the question
"whether the Gertz balance obtains when the defamatory statements involve no issue of public concern." 105 S.Ct. at 1944. In applying the Gertz approach of balancing the State's interest against
the First Amendment interest, the Court held that the State interest
was "strong and legitimate." 105 S.Ct. at 2945. The First Amendment interest, however, the Court found to be "less important" than
that involved in Gertz. Id. The Court explained that "(i)t is Speech
on 'matters of public concern' that is at the heart of the First
Amendment's protection." Id. On the other hand, "speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern."
105 S.Ct. at 2946.
The Court reasoned that "(t)here is no threat to the free and
robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with
a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-government; and
there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of self-censorship by
the press." Id.
In summary, then, the principal cases provide as follows:
1. New York Times enunciated the "actual malice" (deliberate
or reckless falsity standard, which must be alleged and proved if a
public official is the defamation plaintiff.
2. Walker and Butts extended the "actual malice" requirement
also to public figure defamation plaintiffs.
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3. Rosenbloom said that "actual malice" was also required when
the content of the defamation involved matters of general or public
interest, regardless of whether the defamation plaintiff was a public
or private person.
4. Gertz withdrew from the Rosenbloom extension, and said
that matter of general or public interest did not require "actual malice." A private person defamation plaintiff could recover actual
damages in accord with state law, except that there could not be
liability without fault in such a case. To recover presumed or punitive damages, however, the plaintiff must allege and prove "actual
malice."
5. Greenmoss held that Gertz itself applied only to matters of
public concern, and therefore state law governs defamation actions
brought by private person plaintiffs regarding communications that
do not involve matters of public concern. "Actual malice" would be
required to recover presumed damages if the defamation involved a
matter of public concern. (the plurality opinion in Greenmoss Builders specifically dealt only with the applicability of the Gertz requirement with respect to presumed and punitive damages. 105 S.Ct. at
2941. It seems reasonable to infer, however, that Greenmoss Builders applies to Gertz as a whole, including its requirement that the
states do not impose liability without fault. If this is so, a state
could impose strict liability for the defamation of a private citizen
plaintiff when no issue of public concern is involved. Such a conclusion is supported by Justice White's concurring opinion in Greenmoss Builders. He notes that although the plurality opinion speaks
only with respect to presumed and punitive damages, "it must be
that the Gertz requirement of some kind of fault on the part of the
defendant is also inapplicable in cases such as this." 105 S.Ct. at
2953 (White J. concurring).)
D. What Constitutes A Matter of Public Concern?
The Supreme Court plurality found that Greenmoss Builders
involved "no issue of public concern." 105 S.Ct. at 2944. The Court
referred to the following factors as indicating that the defendant's
credit report concerned no public issue:
"It was speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its
specific business audience ....
the speech is wholly false and clearly
damaging to the victim's business reputation ....
Since the credit report was made available to only five subscribers (who) . . . could not

disseminate it further, it cannot be said that the report involves any
'strong interest in the free flow of commercial information.' There is
simply no credible argument that this type of credit reporting requires
special protection to ensure that 'debate on public issues (will) be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open.'" 105 S.Ct. at 2947 (citations
omitted).
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The Court found that credit reporting "is hardly and unlikely to be
deterred by incidental state regulation." Id. Furthermore, it is
"solely motivated by the desire for profit," and the reporting is
"more objectively verifiable than speech deserving of greater protection." Id.
The Court cited another case in which it said that
"(w)hether. . . .speech addresses a matter of public concern must
be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684, (1983). In Connick, the plaintiff alleged
that she was wrongfully discharged from the District Attorney's office because she exercised her constitutionally protected right of free
speech. 461 U.S. at 141, 103 S.Ct. at 1687. After expressing her
strong opposition to her transfer to a different section, the plaintiff
prepared and distributed a questionnaire to her fellow staff members. id. The questioned asked concerned the office transfer policy,
office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work
in political campaigns. Id. Subsequently, the defendant told the
plaintiff that she was being terminated for not accepting the transfer, and he also told her that her distribution of the questionnaire
was considered an act of insubordination. Id.
The Connick court ruled that only the last question was a matter of public concern. 461 U.S. at 149, 103 S.Ct. at 1691. The Court
held that "when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon
matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters
only of personal interest", then it cannot be speech which is a matter of public concern. 461 U.S. at 147, 103 S.Ct. at 1690. If the questionnaire were released to the public, the Court noted that it "would
convey no information at all other than the fact that a single employee is upset with the status quo." 461 U.S. at 148, 103 S.Ct. at
1691. The question concerning pressure to work in political campaigns, however, was found to involve a matter of public concern.
461 U.S. at 149, 103 S.Ct. at 1691. The Court based this conclusion
upon its finding that such pressure "constitutes a coercion of belief
in violation of fundamental constitutional rights" and that "there is
a demonstrated interest in this country that government service
should depend upon meritorious performance rather than political
service." Id.
Of course, the situations involved in New York Times, Gertz,
Walker and Butts, and Rosenbloom, previously discussed, were all
examples of matters of public concern.
The Connick Court also noted some other cases dealing with
matters of public concern. In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391
U.S. 563, 571-72, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1736 (1968), a "matter of legitimate
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public concern" was involved where a teacher openly criticized the
Board of Education for its allocation of school funds between athletics and education and its methods of informing taxpayers about the
need for additional revenue. Similarly, a matter of public concern
involved in Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 97 S.Ct. 568 (1977), where a teacher was not rehired because he
relayed the substance of a memorandum concerning teacher dress
and appearance to a radio station. The memorandum was circulated
to various teachers because of the administration's view that there
was a relationship between teacher appearance and public support
for bond issues.
Absent any clear test for determining what is a matter of public
concern, this question will have to be answered on the facts of each
case. It is apparent from the Court's language in Greenmoss Builders, as well as the factors which the Court considered, that all of the
circumstances surrounding the expression must be considered, not
just the expression itself.

